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Anhedonia, the lack of pleasure, has been shown to be a critical feature of a range
of psychiatric disorders. Yet, it is currently measured primarily through subjective
self-reports and as such has been difficult to submit to rigorous scientific analysis.
New insights from affective neuroscience hold considerable promise in improving our
understanding of anhedonia and for providing useful objective behavioral measures to
complement traditional self-report measures, potentially leading to better diagnoses and
novel treatments. Here, we review the state-of-the-art of hedonia research and specifically
the established mechanisms of wanting, liking, and learning. Based on this framework we
propose to conceptualize anhedonia as impairments in some or all of these processes,
thereby departing from the longstanding view of anhedonia as solely reduced subjective
experience of pleasure. We discuss how deficits in each of the reward components
can lead to different expressions, or subtypes, of anhedonia affording novel ways of
measurement. Specifically, we review evidence suggesting that patients suffering from
depression and schizophrenia show impairments in wanting and learning, while some
aspects of conscious liking seem surprisingly intact. Furthermore, the evidence suggests
that anhedonia is heterogeneous across psychiatric disorders, depending on which parts
of the pleasure networks are most affected. This in turn has implications for diagnosis and
treatment of anhedonia.
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INTRODUCTION
Pleasure has been proposed to be evolution’s boldest trick
allowing species and organisms to seek fundamental, or primary,
rewards ensuring survival and procreation in both individuals
and species (Kringelbach, 2005; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009).
In contrast, anhedonia is the missing or severe reduction in
the ability to fulfil this essential survival function and as such
would appear highly evolutionary maladaptive. Yet, anhedonia
persists in the general population over shorter and longer time-
scales as a key feature of many (if not all) psychiatric disorders,
including mood-, addictive-, and eating disorders (Whybrow,
1998). Psychiatric disorders impose a massive societal burden
with e.g., major depressive disorder (subsequently referred to as
depression) having an estimated lifetime prevalence of at least 15%
(Kessler et al., 2012). The diagnosis of depression requires that
either symptoms of anhedonia or depressed mood are present and
is predicted to become the leading cause of disability by the year
2030 (WHO, 2008).
Unfortunately, the growing appreciation of the important role
of anhedonia in major psychiatric and neurological disorders
has not been matched by a comparable understanding of the
underlying neurobiology, and as a consequence treatment options
are often limited and mostly unsatisfactory. As an example the
evidence suggests that the presence of anhedonia is a predictor of
poor treatment response in depression (Spijker et al., 2001) and
of relapse in addiction (Koob and Le Moal, 2001; Volkow et al.,
2002).
While there are numerous scientific accounts of the
neurobiology of disorders such as depression and schizophrenia,
few studies have looked specifically at the presence and severity
of anhedonia. Since disorders like depression and schizophrenia
are characterized by a number of symptoms, findings from
these studies are not necessarily related to anhedonia, which
has often also not been measured behaviorally (but rather
using self-report measures). Recently there has been increasing
interest in elucidating the neurobiology of specific psychological
behaviors or symptoms, such as anhedonia, rather than disorders
per se (Hyman and Fenton, 2003; Insel et al., 2010; Der-Avakian
and Markou, 2012). The idea is that behavioral processes
(or symptoms), such as hallucinations, are more likely than
diagnostic categories (such as schizophrenia) to be linked to
specific biological components.
Overall, the growing appreciation of the role of anhedonia
across psychiatric disorders has not been matched by scientific
accounts of the anatomy of anhedonia, and the generally
accepted conceptual understanding of anhedonia has been
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largely unaltered since Ribot first defined it over a century
ago as the “inability to experience pleasure” (Ribot, 1896;
Snaith, 1992). Recently, however, there has been some progress,
summarized in various recent reviews (Gorwood, 2008; Treadway
and Zald, 2011; Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012) offering
valuable insight on the underlying neurobiology, but with
divergent conceptual understandings of anhedonia. While
some authors argue in favor of preserving the original
definition of anhedonia as reduced subjective experience of
pleasure (Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012), other authors
make a strong case for distinguishing between deficits in
motivation and consummation in anhedonia (Treadway and Zald,
2011).
In contrast, the scientific study of hedonia (derived from
the ancient Greek word for pleasure: hedone from the sweet
taste of honey, hedus) has undergone substantial progress over
the last twenty years. In particular, hedonia research has led to
the important discovery, that reward consists of multiple sub-
components and processes of wanting, liking and learning that
relate to the appetitive, consummatory and satiety phases of the
pleasure cycle (Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2003; Berridge
and Kringelbach, 2008). The processing of rewards during the
pleasure cycle allows individuals to optimize resource allocation
for survival (see Figure 1). In this review we use the terms pleasure
networks and pleasure system for the brain networks subserving
reward processes to underline the importance of pleasure in
promoting survival.
FIGURE 1 | Pleasure cycle. The brain needs to optimize resource allocation
for survival and individuals are limited in the number of concurrent
behaviors. Survival depends on the engagement with rewards and typically
follows a cyclical time course common to many everyday moments of
positive affect. Within this cycle rewards act as motivational magnets to
initiate, sustain and switch state. The cyclical processing of rewards has
classically been proposed to be associated with appetitive, consummatory
and satiety phases (Sherrington, 1906; Craig, 1918). Research has
demonstrated that this processing is supported by multiple brain networks
and processes, which crucially involves liking (the core reactions to hedonic
impact), wanting (motivational processing of incentive salience), and
learning (typically Pavlovian or instrumental associations and cognitive
representations) (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013). These components wax
and wane during the pleasure cycle and can co-occur at any time.
Importantly, however, wanting processing tends to dominate the appetitive
phase, while liking processing dominates the consummatory phase. In
contrast, learning can happen throughout the cycle. Here we propose that
anhedonia can be conceptualized as specific deficits within this pleasure
cycle. Note that a very few rewards might possibly lack a satiety phase
(suggested candidates for brief or missing satiety phase have included
money, some abstract rewards and some drug and brain stimulation
rewards that activate dopamine systems rather directly).
Consequently, we show how anhedonia can usefully be
conceived as arising from problems with each of these
components (wanting, liking, learning) rather than solely being
defined as subjective affective experience of pleasure as per Ribot’s
original proposal. Related to this, we argue that anhedonia can
occur on both conscious and unconscious levels, which limits the
use of traditional self-report measures (see Box 1). Instead, our
reconceptualization allows for the introduction of more objective,
scientific measurements of the subcomponents of anhedonia
and may in time facilitate the development of more precise
diagnoses and perhaps even novel treatments. Thus, anhedonia
may have different causes, and effects on subsequent behavior,
and these causes and effects can only be examined through more
sophisticated methods than self-report.
In the following we first take a brief look at how anhedonia
has been measured historically, and outline some of the clinical
observations that led us to the proposed reconceptualization of
anhedonia. We then discuss pertinent findings regarding the brain
networks supporting the wanting, liking, and learning processes
underlying the pleasure cycle. We show how the evidence
from behavioral and neuroimaging experiments supports the
hypothesis of subtypes of anhedonia that reflect impairments in
the ability to experience, pursue and/or learn about reward, and
discuss implications for the future diagnosis and treatment of
anhedonia. We draw on findings from animal studies, and while
we stress the need for translational neuroscience, our main focus
is on human studies of anhedonia.
ANHEDONIA IS HETEROGENEOUS ACROSS MAJOR
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
Traditionally anhedonia has been measured with self-report
scales or questionnaires like the Fawcett-Clark Pleasure Scale
(FCPS; Fawcett et al., 1983) or the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure
Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995; see Box 1), which focus on
hedonic responses to pleasurable stimuli. However a number of
recent questionnaires allow for a differentiation between reward
motivation (wanting) and hedonic impact (liking), such as The
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (Gard et al., 2006) and
The Sensitivity To Reinforcement of Addictive and other Primary
Rewards (Goldstein et al., 2010).
While these questionnaires can give valuable information
about the subjective experience of anhedonia, there is compelling
evidence from the scientific literature that individuals are not
always good at introspecting their emotional states consisting
of both conscious and unconscious components (Kringelbach,
2012). Still these questionnaires are applied in the diagnosis and
study of psychiatric disorders, and offer useful information on the
explicit components of anhedonia.
To date, most of the research on anhedonia has been conducted
in patients suffering from schizophrenia (Andreasen and Olsen,
1982; Blanchard et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2004; Gooding et al.,
2005; Blanchard and Cohen, 2006) and depression (Loas, 1996;
Schrader, 1997; Blanchard et al., 2001; Hasler et al., 2004).
Much of the initial research came from the study of
schizophrenia, where anhedonia was described as a core
symptom from the beginning of the 20th century (Bleuler,
1911; Kraepelin, 1919) and viewed as a stable trait that was
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BOX 1 | Anhedonia questionnaires.
Anhedonia has traditionally been measured with self-report
questionnaires. While these can give an indication of the
subjective experience of anhedonia, there is evidence from the
scientific literature that individuals are not always very good at
introspecting their emotional states consisting of both conscious
and unconscious components (Kringelbach, 2012). Still these
questionnaires have been applied in the diagnosis and study of
psychiatric disorders, and offer useful information on the explicit
components of anhedonia.
The Chapman Physical and Social Anhedonia Scale (PAS), and
its revised version (R-PAS), were developed to measure long-
standing, as opposed to transient, anhedonia. Hence, participants
are instructed to “describe yourself as you have been during most
of your adult life” (Chapman et al., 1976). The scale consists of
61-items (in a true-false format) and measures several domains of
pleasure experience, including interest in activities and hobbies,
sensory experiences, pastimes, social interaction and food/drink.
Psychometrically there has been some disagreement regarding
the scale’s construct validity (Germans and Kring, 2000) and
discriminant validity (Leventhal et al., 2006). Further, the design
of the scale might limit its application in research and clinical
settings. With its 61 items it is relatively time consuming, and
the content has been criticized for being out-dated (Horan et al.,
2006).
The Fawcett-Clark Pleasure Scale (FCPS; Fawcett et al., 1983)
is a 36-item questionnaire where participants are asked to
rate imagined reactions to pleasurable situations (e.g., “You
sit watching a beautiful sunset in an isolated, untouched
part of the world”) using a 5-point Likert scale (from “No
pleasure at all” to “Extreme and lasting pleasure”). The scale
measures several domains of anhedonia, including social activities,
sensory experiences, and sense of mastery of difficult tasks;
however, none of the domains tap into the incentive salience
of reward. Participants are asked to respond based on their
current state, thereby measuring anhedonia as a transient state,
which makes the scale suitable for evaluation of treatment
effects in clinical populations. The psychometric properties
of this scale have not been extensively studied, but look
promising (Clark et al., 1984; D’haenen, 1996; Leventhal et al.,
2006).
The Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995)
is a brief 14-item questionnaire that assess hedonic tone, or
its absence, anhedonia. Participants are instructed to agree
or disagree to statements of hedonic response in pleasurable
situations (e.g., “I would enjoy my favorite television or radio
program”). The scale covers four domains of hedonic experience:
interest/pastimes, social interaction, sensory experience, and
food/drink, and participants are instructed to respond based
on their ability to experience pleasure in the last few days
(Snaith et al., 1995). The scale has shown good overall
psychometric properties in clinical and non-clinical samples,
both in terms of convergent and discriminant validity (Snaith
et al., 1995; Gilbert et al., 2002; Leventhal et al., 2006;
Franken et al., 2007). The scale is easily applied in clinical and
research settings, but only taps into the hedonic impact of
reward.
All three questionnaires are routinely used in clinical populations.
Because the R-PAS was designed to measure anhedonia as a
trait-like characteristic, the scale is less suitable for evaluation
of treatment effects in clinical populations. However, in clinical
populations with more chronic forms of anhedonia, such as in
BOX 1 | Continued
schizophrenic patients, this scale is often seen as more suitable
than FCPS and SHAPS. On a positive note, the R-PAS does not
only include items that tap into the hedonic impact of reward, but
also includes items that tap into the incentive salience of a reward
(in contrast to FCPS and SHAPS). Hence, items like “The sound
of rustling leaves has never much pleased me” assess hedonic
reactions to activities, while items such as “I have had very little
desire to try new kinds of food” assess interest in activities,
thereby incorporating aspects of the important component of
wanting.
Building on the neuroscientific insights reviewed here, The
Michigan Wanting and Liking Questionnaire (MWLQ) was recently
developed to specifically measure wanting and liking for use in
patient groups, including compulsive Parkinson’s patients (Version
for Parkinson’s patients with Dopamine Dysregulation Syndrome).
The questionnaire was developed by Berridge et al. and measures
wanting and liking of normal pleasures, such as food, and of
compulsive behaviors, such as pathological gambling activity. The
questionnaire consists of five direct contrast questions (e.g.,
“Overall, which do you usually like or enjoy more: the pleasant
experience of gambling (individually tailored to compulsion) while
you do it, or the pleasant experience of actually eating a favorite
food?”) and 17 scaling questions (e.g., “How much do you usually
want to eat a favorite food when you are going to eat it just
before the meal begins?”). Due to the recent development of this
instrument it has not been subject to large scale psychometric
testing.
The Sensitivity To Reinforcement of Addictive and other Primary
Rewards (STRAP-R; Goldstein et al., 2010) was developed by
Goldstein et al. to assess liking and wanting of expected
drug rewards as compared to food and sex during three
different situations: (a) current, (b) hypothetical, in general,
and (c) under drug influence. Participants are asked to think
about their favorite food, sexual activity and drug or alcohol
without reporting the exact stimulus/activity to the interviewer
such that privacy is maintained. For liking participants rated
“How pleasant would it be to eat it (food), do it (sex) or
use/drink it (drug)”. For wanting participants rated “How much
do you want to eat it (food), do it (sex) or use/drink it (drug)”.
A 5-point Likert scale is used for all questions ranging from 1
(“somewhat”) to 5 (“extremely”). Similar to The MWLQ, the
newly developed STRAP-R has not been subject to psychometric
testing.
The Temporal Experience of Pleasure (TEPS; Gard et al., 2006)
was developed to measure anticipatory and consummatory (online)
experiences of pleasure. It is a brief questionnaire consisting of a
10-item anticipatory and an 8-item consummatory pleasure scale,
where participants are asked to rate statements using a 6-point
Likert scale (from “very false for me” to “very true to me”),
e.g., “When something exciting is coming up in my life, I really
look forward to it” (anticipatory); “The sound of crackling wood
in the fireplace is very relaxing” (consummatory). Examination
of convergent and discriminant validity indicate that the two
scales measure distinct and specific constructs. In particular
the anticipatory scale is related to reward responsiveness and
imagery, while the consummatory is related to openness to
divergent experiences, and appreciation of positive stimuli. Due
to the recency of this instrument, it has only been subject to
limited psychometric testing but interestingly has been cross-
validated and extended in a Chinese clinical sample of patients
with negative and positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Chan et al.,
2010).
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genetically transmitted (Rado, 1956). There is a disagreement
in the literature as to the role of anhedonia in schizophrenia
with some studies stressing that anhedonia is not present
in the majority of patients (Chapman et al., 1976), while
others suggest that anhedonia is one of two key features
involved in the negative symptom complex (Blanchard and
Cohen, 2006). In the DSM-5 anhedonia is not directly part
of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, but important
aspects are captured in some of the negative symptoms:
avolition (inability to initiate and persist in goal-directed
activities), and affective flattening (absence or near absence of
signs of affective expression) (American Psychiatric Association,
2013).
Today, anhedonia is probably most readily recognized in
depression where it is one of two main symptoms required
for the diagnosis (along with depressed mood). In the DSM-5
criteria for depression the term “anhedonia” is not used explicitly,
but is captured in the main criteria as “decreased interest and
pleasure in most activities most of the day (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). As we will see, this definition is probably not
the most useful as it conflates two important subcomponents
of pleasure (i.e., motivation and hedonic impact). But overall,
there is an agreement to the importance of anhedonia in
depression, and a growing acceptance of the need to more
specifically target this symptom to better understand depression
and develop improved treatments (Gorwood, 2008; Treadway and
Zald, 2011).
In the present review our main focus is on the role of
anhedonia in patients suffering from depression or schizophrenia,
where most of the work has been conducted (to date). Although
there are clear similarities between these disorders regarding
the role of anhedonia, it is important to note some of the
crucial differences. In depression, anhedonia can be regarded as
a transient state (except perhaps in the very severe cases), which
is typically defined as a “significant change from before” in the
DSM-5. In contrast, anhedonia would appear to reflect a long-
lasting (or pervasive) trait-like characteristic in schizophrenia.
This difference is supported by findings from a longitudinal
study showing that elevated levels of self-reported anhedonia
remained stable in schizophrenic patients, but declined in
recovered depressed patients after 1-year-follow-up (Blanchard
et al., 2001).
Despite the fact that the majority of anhedonia research has
been related to depression and schizophrenia, it is important
to note the growing evidence that anhedonia also plays an
important role across several other psychiatric- and neurological
disorders such as drug addiction (Hatzigiakoumis et al., 2011)
and Parkinson’s disease (Loas et al., 2012), albeit in heterogeneous
ways.
In fact, one of the main arguments for reconceptualizing
anhedonia is the notion that anhedonia is expressed differently
across disorders, depending on which parts of the pleasure system
are most affected, leading to distinct unbalancing in the brain
networks.
For example, in patients suffering from depression anhedonia
can be expressed as a reduced ability to experience pleasure
and a reduced ability to pursue pleasurable activities (Figure 2,
column 2). Both of these processes are captured in the DSM-
5 criteria where anhedonia is defined as “decreased interest and
pleasure in most activities most of the day”, and compromises
one of two main symptoms required for the diagnosis (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
This type of imbalance, which is characterized by a
progressive decrease in some (or all) of the reward components,
is markedly different from the imbalance that characterizes
addictive behavior. One of the core symptoms of drug addiction
is the excess of wanting for the drug of choice, which in the
pathological cases is rarely accompanied by the expected feeling
of pleasure (Figure 2, column 3). Although drug “wanting” and
drug “liking” are typically strongly linked in the initial phases of
drug use, only “wanting” becomes sensitized and consequently
increases as the addiction develops (Robinson et al., 2013).
The same mechanisms are likely to be at play in behavioral
addictions, such as gambling disorder (Rømer Thomsen et al.,
2009, 2014).
Generally speaking, anhedonia can be expressed differently
across individual patients (sometimes even across time within
the same patient as seen most clearly in bipolar disorder,
but also in other disorders such as addiction (Nelson et al.,
2009)). Importantly, there are also clear differences between the
imbalances across psychiatric disorders (as illustrated above),
suggesting that anhedonia is a complex psychological process,
which consists of several subcomponents, similar to reward
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008).
INSIGHTS FROM PLEASURE RESEARCH
In the following we outline important findings regarding the
underlying brain systems of the subcomponents of reward during
the pleasure cycle (Figure 1). Based on this framework we show
how deficits in each of these components can lead to different
expressions (or subtypes) of anhedonia affording novel ways of
measurement, diagnosis, and treatment.
Summarizing a growing body of literature briefly (extensively
outlined elsewhere, e.g., Kringelbach and Berridge, 2010; Berridge
and Kringelbach, in press), pleasure should be seen within
the general framework of evolution as the process by which
organisms seek the fundamental rewards ensuring survival and
procreation. As such, food and sex are fundamental pleasures, and
especially food studies have formed the basis of much hedonia
research. In addition, in social species such as humans, social
interactions are also fundamental rewards (King-Casas et al.,
2005; Kringelbach et al., 2008; Frith and Frith, 2010; Chelnokova
et al., 2014). The full repertoire of social pleasures has proven
more difficult for experimental investigation and manipulation,
yet e.g., the evidence from neuroimaging studies of the role of
facial expressions has demonstrated that these pleasures are likely
to be as pleasurable as the sensory pleasures (Kringelbach and
Rolls, 2003; Rømer Thomsen et al., 2011). Furthermore, humans
have the capacity to enjoy higher order rewards, such as musical,
artistic, altruistic, and intellectual pleasures. Although the
neuroscience of higher order pleasures is still in its relative infancy,
there is evidence to suggest that all rewards are translated into
a common hedonic currency (Frijda, 2010; Leknes and Tracey,
2010; Vuust and Kringelbach, 2010; Salimpoor et al., 2011).
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 49 | 4
Rømer Thomsen et al. Reconceptualizing anhedonia
FIGURE 2 | Anhedonia: examples of unbalancing of pleasure processing
in the brain. In the normal brain, wanting, liking, and learning processes are
balanced over time (column 1: hedonic equilibrium). Deficits in some or all of
the reward components can lead to various expressions, or subtypes of
anhedonia, that are associated with different imbalances of the pleasure
system. For example, depressed patients often report a reduced ability to
pursue, experience and learn from pleasurable experiences (column 2). This
type of imbalance, which is characterized by a progressive decrease in some
(or all) of the reward components, is markedly different from the imbalance
that characterizes addictive disorders, where “wanting” to take e.g., drugs
grows over time independently of “liking” for drugs (column 3). Please note
that these illustrations are simplifications of the numerous ways anhedonia
can be expressed. For example, according to the available data not all
depressed patients lack core “liking” reactions in here-and-now
assessments. It is even possible that in some depressed patients core
“liking” reactions are retained, but are not cognitively valued as before, which
is reflected as reduced liking in self-report inventories rating retrospective and
prospective experiences.
BASIC PLEASURE BUILDING BLOCKS
Advances in how we define, study, and measure reward have
facilitated substantial progress in hedonia research, which form
important building blocks in our proposed framework of
reconceptualizing anhedonia. In the late 1980s and beginning of
the 1990s Kent Berridge and Terry Robinson set the stage for
an important turn in hedonia research by proposing to divide
reward into the subcomponents of wanting, liking, and learning
(Berridge et al., 1989; Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Robinson
and Berridge, 1993).
These conceptualizations have formed the basis of seminal
findings. The taxonomy holds that wanting is defined as the
motivation for, or incentive salience of a reward, while liking is
the actual pleasure or hedonic impact of a reward. Learning is
defined as associations, representations, and predictions about
future rewards based on past experience, hence representing the
time-related perspective of wanting and liking. Each component
plays important roles as they wax and wane during the appetitive,
consummatory and satiety phases of the cyclical time course of
the pleasure cycle (see Figure 1).
Importantly, these psychological states consist of both
unconscious and conscious components (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2008). For example, hedonic impact consists
of core “liking” reactions (denoted with quotation marks),
that are potentially unconscious, and conscious liking (without
quotation marks), which is the subjective experience of pleasure,
capturing the everyday sense of the word as conscious feelings of
pleasure or niceness (see Figure 3A).
Similarly, core “wanting” reactions are not necessarily
conscious and are often triggered by reward-related cues. In
contrast wanting is the everyday sense of the word as subjective,
conscious desires for incentives or declarative goals.
In the same vein, core “learning” is the implicit knowledge
as well as associative conditioning, such as basic Pavlovian and
instrumental associations, while learning is the explicit and
cognitive associations, representations and predictions about
future rewards based on past experience.
This framework has paved the way for a scientific study
of pleasure by allowing researchers to quantify, measure, and
connect the different components (Berridge and Kringelbach,
2008). This research program has helped to identify the
psychological components, measurements and brain circuitry, by
extending our knowledge from self-report measures of pleasure
in humans with knowledge from behavioral- and physiological
procedures, thereby also allowing for a scientific study of
unconscious reward components (see Figure 3).
Examples of pleasure-elicited behavioral “liking” reactions are
the affective orofacial expressions elicited by the hedonic impact
of sweet tastes. These facial “liking” reactions were first described
in newborn human infants (Steiner, 1973, 1974; Steiner et al.,
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FIGURE 3 | Measuring anhedonia and hedonia. (A) Anhedonia is linked
to problems with the complex and multifaceted psychological processes
involved in hedonia. These include explicit processes of wanting, liking
and learning that are consciously experienced and their unconscious
counterparts (denoted with quotation marks in the text) that are
potentially unconscious i.e., they can operate at a level not always
accessible to conscious experience. These components constantly
interact and require careful scientific analysis to tease apart. Animal
studies have provided measurements or behavioral procedures that are
especially sensitive markers of each of the unconscious processes
(“wanting”, “liking” and “learning”). Recently, some of these procedures
have been successfully translated to human studies, thereby providing
more objective behavioral measures to aid subjective self-report
measures. In particular, recent developments of behavioral measures of
“wanting” and “learning” are promising, while bias-free measures of
“liking” reactions in humans have proven more difficult. (B,C) Examples
of how a measure of “wanting” has been successfully translated from
animal to human studies. (B) In animal studies, “wanting” can be
measured by looking at how willing the animal is to exert effort in
exchange for more palatable food rewards, for example by using a
choice paradigm devised to look at effort-based decision-making
(Salamone et al., 1994, 2007). (C) In human studies, “wanting” can be
measured similarly, by looking at how much a participant is willing to
work for a reward, for example by combining salient stimuli with
key-press/force-grip procedures. The first study of this kind used
key-presses to operationalize “wanting” as the effort participants exerted
to increase or decrease viewing time of images of faces on a screen
(Aharon et al., 2001). Abbreviations: OFC: orbitofrontal cortex. ACC:
anterior cingulate cortex. vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex. NAc:
nucleus accumbens. PAG: periaqueductal gray. VP: ventral pallidum. VTA:
ventral tegmental area. ACh: Acethylcholine. PIT: pavlovian instrumental
transfer. *: For questionnaires, see Box 1.
2001) and then extended to rodents (Pfaffmann et al., 1977;
Grill and Norgren, 1978a,b). Using taste-reactivity paradigms
several studies have now shown that sweet tastes elicit positive
facial “liking” expressions (i.e., rhythmic licking of lips) in
human infants and in rats, whereas bitter tastes elicit facial
“disliking” expressions (i.e., gapes.). Since facial “liking” reactions
appear to be similar between humans and other mammals
(Berridge, 2000; Steiner et al., 2001), findings from animal
studies are applicable and useful for our understanding of human
pleasure.
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Similarly, a useful way to study “wanting” in rodents is to look
at food intake and behavior related to obtainment of rewards.
Particularly interesting are measures of the effort exerted to obtain
pleasurable stimuli, and the ability of reward-related cues to
act as motivational magnets. The former can be measured by
looking at how eagerly the animal runs for sweet rewards in a
runway (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Peciña et al., 2003), or
how willing the animal is to exert effort in exchange for more
palatable food rewards (Salamone et al., 1994, 2007). The latter
can be measured by looking at Pavlovian conditioned approach
behavior and Pavlovian Instrumental Transfer (PIT; Wyvell and
Berridge, 2000, 2001; see Figure 3).
Overall, there is extensive evidence suggesting that the reward
system has been conserved across species, and that the same brain
structures are involved in affective reactions, whether it is a rat, a
monkey, or a human, which makes a strong case for translational
research in this area (Ongür and Price, 2000; Berridge, 2003;
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008).
Studies using measures like these yield compelling evidence
to support the view that reward is not a unitary process, but
is instead a complex process containing several psychological
components that correspond to distinguishable, and partly
dissociable, neurobiological mechanisms, although the
terminology may vary (Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Schultz,
2006; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008; Leknes and Tracey, 2008).
The underlying brain systems of wanting, liking, and learning
have been reviewed in detail elsewhere, for a comprehensive
review see (Berridge and Kringelbach, in press). Below we briefly
review what we know about the underlying brain systems, and
particularly, how the components can be dissociated.
PARSING LIKING, WANTING, AND LEARNING
The conscious experience of hedonic impact and the underlying
“liking” reactions are at the heart of pleasure and is what we
intuitively associate with pleasure. Several regions have been
found to code for the hedonic impact of reward in the human
brain, including cortical regions such as orbitofrontal-, cingulate-,
and insular cortex, and subcortical regions such as nucleus
accumbens, ventral pallidum, amygdala, and brainstem ventral
tegmental area and periaqueductal gray (Kringelbach, 2005;
Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009; see Figure 4A).
In the rodent brain, so-called hedonic “hotspots” have
been identified, i.e., areas where direct stimulation with
microinjections of e.g., opioid agonists can cause or amplify
“liking” reactions (Figure 4B). These hotspots have primarily
been found in forebrain structures such as nucleus accumbens
and ventral pallidum and in the parabrachial nucleus of the
brainstem. Stimulation with opioids here, or other signals such
as endocannabinoid or orexin, can amplify sensory pleasure by
doubling or tripling the normal number of “liking” reactions to
sucrose taste (Peciña and Berridge, 2005; Smith and Berridge,
2005; Mahler et al., 2007; Ho and Berridge, 2013).
Only one of the hedonic hotspots in the posterior ventral
pallidum appears to be necessary in the sense that damage to
it abolishes and replaces “liking” reactions to sweetness with
“disliking” (Cromwell and Berridge, 1993). The difficulty of
damaging the “liking” generators attests to the robustness of the
brain’s capacity for basic hedonic impact processing (Smith et al.,
2010) and might offer an explanation as to why hedonic impact
can appear to be intact in patients suffering from depression
and schizophrenia (at least with here-and-now measures, we will
return to this in section Impairments in liking ).
In humans, the mid-anterior orbitofrontal cortex plays a
crucial role in the translation of subcortically driven “liking”
reactions into our conscious feelings of pleasure and may also
be involved in the actual generation of conscious feelings of
pleasure (Kringelbach, 2005; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009;
Figure 4C).
The subjective hedonic experience of reward has also been
shown to correlate with activity in rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Petrovic et al., 2008).
Interestingly this activity in rostral anterior cingulate cortex is
partially suppressed after naloxone treatment (Petrovic et al.,
2008). Equally, the hedonic experience has also been linked to
interoceptive mapping (in posterior insula cortex) and “feeling
states” (in anterior insula cortex) (e.g., Craig, 2002). Both
the rostral anterior cingulate and insula cortices have large
concentrations of opioid receptors (e.g., shown in opioid receptor
binding PET study by Willoch et al., 2004) and show increased
activity following opioid treatment (Petrovic et al., 2002) which
could indicate that they may be part of a larger opioid network
that has both cortical and subcortical components (Vogt and
Sikes, 2000; Fields, 2004).
In contrast the orbitofrontal cortex does not have an equally
large opioid-receptor concentration (e.g., Willoch et al., 2004)
and unlike rostral anterior cingulate and insular cortices, the
orbitofrontal cortex was not found to be active following opioid
treatment (Petrovic et al., 2002, 2010). Yet, other positron
emission tomography (PET) studies have shown opioid release
in the human orbitofrontal cortex linked to placebo and alcohol
consumption (Scott et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2012). On balance,
some of these studies may lend some support to a division where
rostral anterior cingulate and insular cortices are more strongly
associated with the opioid-dependent liking system (Berridge
and Kringelbach, in press), although new tentative findings
have identified hedonic hotspots in all of the homologous
areas in rodents including the orbitofrontal cortex (Berridge and
Kringelbach, in press). This could support the idea that all of these
regions are related to the hedonic aspect of reward processing,
but also that at least some parts of the orbitofrontal cortex may
be more associated with a higher cognitive non-opioid dependent
system, possibly the dopamine-dependent wanting system.
Although motivational processes have not traditionally been
associated with anhedonia, as per Ribot’s definition, there is
increasing evidence that this part of the pleasure cycle is in
fact most pertinent in terms of optimizing well-being (Fervaha
et al., 2013b; Robinson et al., 2013; Treadway and Zald, 2013).
Overall, core “wanting” reactions would appear to be generated
in the mesolimbic systems of the brain, in particular those
involving dopamine, while the conscious experience of desires
and incentives recruits cortical regions, including orbitofrontal-
, cingulate-, and insular cortex (see Figure 4).
Mesolimbic dopamine was long considered a pleasure
neurotransmitter involved in the hedonic impact of reward (e.g.,
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FIGURE 4 | Pleasure systems in the brain. The schematic figure shows
the brain regions for causing and coding fundamental reward processing
in rodents and humans. (A) Hedonic causation has been identified in
rodents as arising from interlinked subcortical hedonic hotspots, such as
in nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum, where neural activation may
increase or decrease “liking” expressions to sweetness, or “wanting”
responses to rewards, depending on the specific area of stimulation.
Similar pleasure coding and incentive salience networks have also been
identified in humans. (B) Hedonic hotspots have been found in nucleus
accumbens shell and in the ventral pallidum in rodents. (C) The cortical
localization of pleasure coding may reach an apex in various regions of the
human orbitofrontal cortex, which differentiates subjective pleasantness
from valence processing aspects of the same stimulus, such as a
pleasant food.
Wise, 1980), but increasing evidence now suggests that this
is not the case. Studies teasing apart “liking” and “wanting”
have convincingly shown that specific manipulation of dopamine
signaling fails to shift “liking” reactions to pleasure reliably in
animals and humans (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Peciña et al.,
2003; Ward et al., 2012). Instead, evidence points to an important
role of dopamine in “wanting” processes. For example, studies
show that elevation of dopamine in rats makes the animal run
more eagerly towards sweet rewards and cause increases in food
consumption (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Peciña et al., 2003)
and increases the animal’s willingness to work for food reward
(Bardgett et al., 2009), while attenuation or blockade of dopamine
has the opposite effect (Cousins and Salamone, 1994; Salamone
et al., 2007). Similarly, overexpression of D2 receptors impairs
an animal’s willingness to work for a reward, while “liking”
reactions are preserved (Ward et al., 2012). Studies using PIT
paradigms or progressive ratio schedules also support the notion
that dopamine plays a crucial role in the motivational processes
of hedonia and anhedonia (Barr and Phillips, 1999; Der-Avakian
and Markou, 2010; Venugopalan et al., 2011; Peciña and Berridge,
2013).
Similarly, human studies show that elevated levels of
dopamine, induced by amphetamine or L-Dopa, increase ratings
of wanting for the drug, but not ratings of liking when actually
taking the drug (Leyton et al., 2002, 2007; Liggins et al., 2012; see
Figure 2). Notably, amphetamine-induced elevated dopamine has
recently been shown to increase willingness to work for rewards,
thereby providing evidence that dopamine affects “wanting” in
humans using a more objective, behavioral measure (Wardle et al.,
2011).
Similar to dopamine, elevation of opioids in rats increases
“wanting” reactions. For example, it has recently been shown
that dopamine and opioid stimulation of nucleus accumbens
similarly amplify cue-triggered “wanting” for reward in a study
using a PIT paradigm (Peciña and Berridge, 2013). Importantly,
morphine-induced elevated levels of opioids were recently shown
to increase willingness to work for a reward in humans (using a
behavioral measure), while naltreoxone-induced decreased levels
had the opposite effect (Chelnokova et al., 2014). Notably, the
same study provided similar evidence of the role of opioids in
reward liking in humans (i.e., stimulation of the opioid system
enhanced self-reported liking ratings while the antagonist had the
opposite effect), in line with animal studies.
Still, the interactions between the opioid-dependent liking
system and dopamine-dependent wanting system are not fully
understood at this time. For example, a study has found
an increased subjective liking associated with amphetamine
treatment—which can be suppressed after naltrexone treatment
(Jayaram-Lindström et al., 2004). Equally, evidence is emerging
that there is a dynamic interdependency between goal-directed
and habitual systems (Wassum et al., 2009). This suggests that
increased dopamine activity can also increase opioid activity
to rewards, and in general the interactions between these
neurotransmitter systems are important to investigate in future.
The evidence suggests that areas that cause “wanting” reactions
are more widespread in the brain than areas that cause “liking”
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reactions. For example, in the nucleus accumbens shell, the
hedonic hotspot (where opioid stimulation amplifies “liking”
reactions) is only a cubic millimeter in size, while the entire
medial shell mediates opioid-stimulated increases in “wanting”
(Zhang et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2011; Peciña and Berridge,
2013). This may predispose us more naturally to states of
desire than to states of hedonic impact (Robinson et al.,
2013).
Taken together, the evidence shows that wanting and liking
are partly dissociated in the brain. Although we generally want
what we like and vice versa this is not always the case. This
is particularly evident in drug addiction, which is characterized
by an excess of craving for drugs, which is rarely matched by
a comparable positive hedonic impact (Robinson and Berridge,
1993; Robinson et al., 2013). Further, while conscious and
unconscious components are usually linked, this is not always
the case. For example, a core “liking” reaction can also happen
without subjective awareness (Berridge and Winkielman, 2003;
Winkielman et al., 2005).
Although it is more challenging to parse “wanting” and
“learning” evidence suggests that it is possible to parse learned
predictions apart from “wanting” (incentive salience) (Berridge
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011). One line of evidence comes from
neural coding studies of “wanting”, particularly after dopamine-
elevated brain activity (by amphetamine or prior sensitization).
While dopamine elevation seems to enhance neural firing to
signals that encode maximal incentive salience, it does not
enhance neural signals that code maximal prediction (Tindell
et al., 2005).
Another line of evidence comes from studies where “wanting”
of a conditioned stimulus is reversed, while the learned prediction
remains the same. For example, a cue predicting saltiness would
normally not be “wanted”, but if a salt appetite is induced,
the cue will suddenly turn into a “wanted” cue (Robinson and
Berridge, 2013). This change in motivation is not dependent on
new learning or changes in learned predictions.
Overall, these findings indicate that “wanting” and “learning”
have distinct psychological identities and distinguishable neural
substrates—although more studies are needed before we can
determine how these psychological states are parsed within the
brain.
RECONCEPTUALIZING ANHEDONIA
These new insights from the study of pleasure in humans
and other animals open up the possibility of reconceptualizing
anhedonia to reflect the heterogeneous and complex nature
of reward processing. Based on the framework developed by
Berridge and Robinson we propose to conceptualize anhedonia
as potential impairments in wanting, liking and learning
components, which can lead to different expressions, or subtypes
of anhedonia, depending on which parts of the pleasure networks
are most affected. In the normal brain, wanting, liking and
learning processes are balanced over the pleasure cycle and over
longer time scales, but impairments in each of the components
can lead to a breakdown of this balance (see Figure 2). This
breakdown can be temporary (e.g., as seen in depression) or
longer lasting (as seen e.g., in schizophrenia) and can manifest
itself in different ways to self-report measures (see Box 1;
Figure 3).
In the following we review the evidence suggesting that
anhedonia can be expressed as impairments in the ability to
experience, pursue, and/or learn from reward, and discuss how
these processes can be measured on different levels of analysis
that can aid traditional self-report measures. This leads to our
proposed reconceptualization of anhedonia and a discussion of
how the components of anhedonia are affected across major
psychiatric disorders (Figures 2, 3).
IMPAIRMENTS IN LIKING
In humans the most straightforward way to measure liking is to
ask people to self-report using various scales and questionnaires
to quantify the experienced pleasure of different stimuli or
activities. However, self-report is not always a reliable indicator of
the state of the underlying pleasure networks. Studies have shown
that what we subjectively report as pleasurable is not always in
accordance with our behavior (Aharon et al., 2001; Winkielman
et al., 2005; Moeller et al., 2009) and there is evidence that reward
affects our behavior, even when we are not consciously aware of
it (Winkielman et al., 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2007, 2008; Aarts
et al., 2008). Still, these measures are used and provide valuable
information on the explicit components of anhedonia.
Self-report measures of liking
The literature of changes in hedonic impact processing in patients
with psychiatric disorders is highly heterogeneous and has used
a variety of self-report measurements (including self-report
questionnaires, see Box 1).
A popular way of measuring liking in humans is to assess
self-reported hedonic reactivity (i.e., ratings of pleasure) and
sensitivity (i.e., identification and threshold) to various pleasant
solutions and odors in a here-and-now setting. As such,
it resembles the taste-reactivity paradigm, which has been
successfully used in animals and newborn babies, but with the
important difference that it is based on self-report. This paradigm
has been used to study reduced liking in depressed patients and
shows mixed findings in terms of sensitivity. While some studies
show reduced sensitivity to pleasant gustatory and olfactory
stimuli (Berlin et al., 1998; Pause et al., 2001; Lombion-Pouthier
et al., 2006; Clepce et al., 2010; Negoias et al., 2010), other studies
report normal levels of identification and perception thresholds
in depressed patients (Scinska et al., 2004, 2008; Swiecicki et al.,
2009; Clepce et al., 2010).
Importantly, most studies of depressed patients and
non-clinical participants with depressive symptoms report
similar, or higher, pleasantness ratings to sweet solutions
(Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin et al., 1998; Scinska et al.,
2004; Swiecicki et al., 2009; Dichter et al., 2010) and various
odors (Steiner et al., 1993; Pause et al., 2001; Lombion-Pouthier
et al., 2006; Scinska et al., 2008; Swiecicki et al., 2009; Clepce
et al., 2010), compared to healthy controls. Similarly, studies
of patients suffering from schizophrenia fail to show decreased
hedonic reactivity to pleasurable stimuli in comparison to healthy
controls (Heerey and Gold, 2007; Barch and Dowd, 2010; Strauss
and Gold, 2012). In contrast to this, patients suffering from
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depression and schizophrenia report reduced enjoyment when
asked to rate prospective, retrospective, or hypothetical experiences
(McFarland and Klein, 2009; Watson and Naragon-Gainey, 2010;
Strauss and Gold, 2012).
The majority of studies tapping into hedonic reactivity and
sensitivity have been done with depressed and schizophrenic
patients, while studies looking specifically at anhedonic
symptoms are lacking. Part of the conflict between the hypothesis
of reduced liking and findings of normal levels in these patients
may benefit from a focus on anhedonic symptoms per se. For
example, an inverse relationship between hedonic responses to
sucrose and physical anhedonia scores has been found (Berlin
et al., 1998). Similarly, a recent study looking at olfactory
hedonics in patients in a depressive state, a remitted state and
healthy controls, found no differences in hedonic and intensity
estimates between groups. However, during the depressive state,
they found a negative relation between anhedonia symptoms and
olfactory hedonics, with high scores on the SHAPS being related
to low hedonic estimates (Clepce et al., 2010).
Surprisingly few studies have looked at hedonic reactivity and
sensitivity in unipolar vs. bipolar patients. Bipolar patients are
of particular relevance as their hedonic capacity, or at least their
cognitive construal about hedonic experiences, is likely to be
affected by changes to their current state (i.e., whether they are
in an acute manic or depressive episode).
A recent study looked at hedonic reactivity and sensitivity to
pleasant/unpleasant olfactory and gustatory stimuli in unipolar
and bipolar patients (Swiecicki et al., 2009). They reported no
differences between groups in measures of sensitivity, but bipolar
patients, compared to unipolar patients, tended to rate gustatory
stimuli as more unpleasant and olfactory stimuli as more pleasant.
Unfortunately, the study did not report whether the bipolar
patients were in a manic or depressive episode at time of testing.
So far, studies investigating sensory pleasures in anhedonic
patients have primarily focused on taste and odor, while other
sensory pleasures such as touch remain unexplored. Findings
from these studies are potentially highly relevant, but more
studies are needed before we can determine if the hedonic capacity
across sensory pleasures is attenuated in anhedonia.
Physiological measures of liking
It is crucial that self-report measures are combined with more
objective measures of “liking” reactions. However, finding bodily
markers of emotional feelings and pleasure “liking” in humans
is challenging (Steiner et al., 2001), and we are still in need of
proper methods. For instance, the orofacial “liking” reactions to
sweet and bitter taste, which have formed the basis of seminal
findings in pleasure research in rodents and other animals, are not
easily transferred to human studies. With time humans learn to
carefully control these behavioral reactions, either by inhibiting or
imitating them, which limit the use of them as objective markers
of pleasure and emotional feelings. Some physiological measures
have been used, e.g., showing that people who score high on
self-reported measures of anhedonia show hypo-responsiveness
on measures of heart rate and facial expression to emotion-
eliciting pictures (Ferguson and Katkin, 1996) and scripts (Fiorito
and Simons, 1994) and report lower hedonic responses to
emotion-eliciting pictures (Ferguson and Katkin, 1996) and
scripts (Fiorito and Simons, 1994).
Although physiological measures are more objective in nature,
and as such avoid some of the bias inherent in self-report, they
are often non-specific in nature and thus difficult to interpret.
For instance, with measures such as heart rate, skin conductance
response or respiration depth, the inherent non-specificity of
these measures means that it is difficult to evaluate whether
responses are due to changes in positive or negative affect.
Electromyographic (EMG) recordings are effective in detecting
emotion-related facial movements, including movements that are
not visible to observers (Dimberg, 1982, 1990). Studies have
revealed that we react with distinct facial EMG in response
to emotional facial expressions (partly reflecting a tendency to
mimic the facial stimuli) (Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998), and
these reactions have been demonstrated even in conditions where
participants are unconsciously exposed to facial stimuli (Dimberg
et al., 2000). Although it is unlikely that all changes in facial
musculature are emotion-related, recordings of EMG reactions
could provide a promising mean of investigating deficits in
“liking” reactions to facial stimuli. EMG reactions have been
related to e.g., empathy (Dimberg et al., 2011), but more work is
needed to confirm that these facial reactions are faithful indicators
of reward “liking”.
Other physiological measures, which may be more bias-free
and straightforward to interpret, are measures specific to sexual
pleasures. For example, Georgiadis et al. measured rectal pressure
variability in combination with self-reported perceived level of
sexual arousal to distinguish between female sexual arousal,
simulation of and real orgasms (Georgiadis et al., 2006). To
our knowledge, this type of measure has not been used in
patients with self-reported anhedonia symptoms, but represents
a promising tool to help elucidate impairments relating to sexual
activity.
Neuroimaging measures of liking
Several neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural
correlates of anhedonia in terms of reduced liking, typically by
using self-report measures of pleasure liking and/or emotional
visual stimuli (e.g., pictures of happy and sad faces), or by
looking at neural responses to receiving a reward. Related to
this, recent studies have used the Monetary Incentive Delay
(MID) task, which distinguishes between reward anticipation and
consummation, similar to wanting and liking (Knutson et al.,
2000).
In studies of depressed patients (or participants with elevated
symptoms of self-reported anhedonia) findings consistently
show a positive correlation between levels of anhedonia and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) activity (extending to
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices) in response to
positive/pleasant stimuli (Kumari et al., 2003; Mitterschiffthaler
et al., 2003; Keedwell et al., 2005; Epstein et al., 2006).
Further, findings show a negative association between anhedonia
severity and activity in subcortical regions, particularly in ventral
striatum, in response to positive/pleasant stimuli (Limousin et al.,
1995; Dunn et al., 2002; Keedwell et al., 2005; Surguladze et al.,
2005; Epstein et al., 2006; Wacker et al., 2009). Overall, studies
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of depressed patients (and not anhedonia per se) have revealed
diminished activity in striatum, particularly ventral striatum,
in response to receipt of reward (McCabe et al., 2009, 2010;
Pizzagalli et al., 2009; Smoski et al., 2009).
In patients suffering from schizophrenia there is also evidence
of blunted ventral striatum responses to reward receipt, although
findings are more mixed (possibly reflecting the fact that this
patient group is more heterogeneous). In general, however,
studies have reported an association between reduced striatal
responses to reward receipt and increased negative or depressive
symptoms (Waltz et al., 2009, 2010; Simon et al., 2010).
These findings lend support to the hypothesis that the
anhedonia seen in patients can be characterized by specific
changes to the pleasure networks through dual changes in activity
in ventral striatum (including the nucleus accumbens) and in
the prefrontal cortex (including the VMPFC and orbitofrontal
cortex) (Gorwood, 2008; Willner et al., 2013). Such ideas would
fit well with findings from Berridge et al. who have shown that
stimulation with opioids in the nucleus accumbens (shell) and in
the ventral pallidum increases “liking”, as illustrated by the so-
called hedonic hotspots (Peciña and Berridge, 2005; Smith and
Berridge, 2007). In addition, the recent study by Chelnokova et al.
points to a similar role of opioids in human liking (Chelnokova
et al., 2014), although human hedonic hotspots have not been
demonstrated to date.
Summary
Overall, there are conflicting findings in the literature and
at the moment the evidence does not support the simple
hypothesis that anhedonia is always accompanied by reduced
liking ratings and associated “liking” reactions to pleasurable
stimuli. Taste-reactivity studies measuring self-reported liking
in here-and-now settings show normal levels of enjoyment in
patients suffering from depression and schizophrenia. In contrast,
studies measuring prospective, retrospective and hypothetical
experiences of pleasure find reduced levels of liking in these
patients.
It is important to stress that the reported finding that here-
and-now measures of liking are surprisingly intact in depressed
and schizophrenic patients is based only on self-report. Future
studies applying valid behavioral or physiological measures may
inform us differently, and are needed before we can make
conclusive statements.
Findings from imaging studies have revealed blunted
responses to rewards in a network of structures including
subcortical regions, which could point to a reduced “liking”
reaction, but these measures need to be accompanied by valid
behavioral measures. One of the great challenges is to find
valid measures and bodily markers of core “liking” processes in
humans that can be applied in neuroscience.
IMPAIRMENTS IN WANTING
Similar to liking, a straightforward way to measure wanting
is to ask people about their desires. Further, a number of
promising behavioral tasks have recently been developed that
measure “wanting” processes, primarily by looking at how much
participants are willing to work for a reward. This translation
of measures from the animal literature, where effort-based
measures of behavior have long been used to study motivational
processes, is promising, and may allow us to investigate “wanting”
processes that are outside our conscious awareness and control
(see Figure 3). At the same time, proper use of these methods is
crucial for valid interpretation of the data.
Behavioral measures of wanting
Aharon et al. developed one of the first behavioral measures of
“wanting” for use in humans (Aharon et al., 2001). In their key-
press task, “wanting” was operationalized as the amount of work
participants performed in order to change the relative duration
they viewed images of average and beautiful faces. The study
found a difference between self-reported liking ratings and effort,
with heterosexual males rating beautiful female and male faces as
equally attractive, but using more effort to keep the female faces
on the screen. We and other groups have used similar measures
of effort, and e.g., found support for a dissociation of conscious
appraisal (liking) and behavioral responsivity (“wanting”) to
infant faces (Parsons et al., 2011).
Importantly this type of measure has now also been used in
patients. In a study of cocaine addiction, Moeller et al., showed
that cocaine addicted used more effort to view cocaine-related
pictures compared to control participants. Furthermore, there
was a discrepancy between self-reported ratings and behavior:
while cocaine addicted rated pictures of pleasant scenes as more
pleasant than cocaine-related pictures, they did not show this
preference in the behavioral choice task (Moeller et al., 2009). This
dissociation, or impaired insight, is in line with previous findings
of a disconnection between subjective and objective markers of
behavior in drug addiction (Goldstein et al., 2007, 2008, 2009;
Hester et al., 2007). Impaired insight and self-control is an
important feature of drug and behavioral addiction (Goldstein
et al., 2009; Changeux and Lou, 2011; Rømer Thomsen et al.,
2013; Moeller and Goldstein, 2014; Voon et al., 2014), which
underscores the need to compliment self-report ratings with
behavioral measures in these patients.
Other groups of researchers have used a related and promising
measure of effort by using a handgrip device in combination
with subliminal priming paradigms to measure motivational
processes outside of our awareness (Pessiglione et al., 2007;
Aarts et al., 2008). Aarts et al. showed that subliminally priming
of the concept of exertion prepares people to display forceful
action, and when these subliminal primes are accompanied with
a positive stimulus it motivates people to spend extra effort
(Aarts et al., 2008). Pessiglione et al. used a similar set-up to
look at unconscious motivation by using an incentive force task
that varied the amount and reportability of monetary rewards
for which participants exerted physical effort (Pessiglione et al.,
2007). In line with Aarts et al., findings showed that even when
participants cannot report how much money is at stake, they still
deploy more force for higher amounts. This type of effort measure
has not been applied to samples of patients with anhedonia yet,
but represents a promising way to investigate “wanting” processes
that are not necessarily conscious.
Another good example of how animal models of motivation
can be translated to human studies comes from Treadway
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et al. who developed an effort-based decision-making task (the
“effort expenditure for rewards task”, EEfRT) (Treadway et al.,
2009) based on an animal model (Salamone et al., 1994).
In the task reduced “wanting” is operationalized as a decreased
willingness to choose greater-effort/greater-reward over less-
effort/less-reward options with varying probability. Initially the
task was employed in a student sample, where they found
an inverse relationship between self-reported anhedonia and
willingness to expend effort for rewards. Recently, the task has
been employed in relevant patient groups. Compared to controls,
patients with subsyndromal depression, first-episode depression
or with remitted depression were less willing to expend effort for
rewards (Treadway et al., 2012a; Yang et al., 2014). Similarly, two
recent studies reported decreased willingness to expend effort for
rewards in patients suffering from schizophrenia (Fervaha et al.,
2013c; Gold et al., 2013). These findings are promising, however,
it shoud be noted that in these tasks, unlike the animal models,
the human participants are not working for fundamental rewards
but for monetary reward. It is an open question whether abstract
rewards such as money are treated in the same way as fundamental
rewards, but there is emerging evidence to suggest that there
are important differences in the underlying brain processing
(Sescousse et al., 2013a,b).
Neuroimaging measures of wanting
To our knowledge, no imaging studies have directly investigated
changes in “wanting” in a patient group with anhedonia.
Although the EEfRT has been applied to relevant groups of
patients, findings from imaging studies have not yet been
published. Recently, however, the task has been used to
investigate the role of dopamine in effort-based decision-
making by using PET imaging and dopaminergic manipulation
(Wardle et al., 2011; Treadway et al., 2012b). Further, imaging
studies using gambling tasks that provide valuable information
on reward anticipation (albeit without behavioral measures)
have been applied to relevant patients. Lastly, findings from
studies measuring wanting in healthy participants are potentially
informative of the mechanisms that are impaired in patients with
anhedonia.
As reviewed in section Parsing liking, wanting, and learning,
mesolimbic dopamine circuitry has consistently been shown
to play a crucial role in “wanting” responses in animals.
Recently, Wardle et al., provided some of the first evidence that
dopamine affects “wanting” similarly in humans, by showing
that administration of the dopamine agonist d-amphetamine
produces dose-dependent increases in the willingness to work
for rewards, as assessed by the EEfRT (Wardle et al., 2011).
A subsequent PET-study showed that individual differences in
dopamine function in left striatum were positively correlated
with willingness to expend greater effort for larger rewards
(particularly when probability of reward was low, which is a
general finding with this task) (Treadway et al., 2012b).
These findings are in line with findings from functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using gambling tasks
to investigate reward anticipation, which have shown diminished
responses to anticipation of reward in the ventral striatum in
patients suffering from depression (Forbes et al., 2009; Smoski
et al., 2009) and schizophrenia (Juckel et al., 2006a,b; Simon
et al., 2010; Dowd and Barch, 2012).
Taken together, the data provides strong support for a critical
role of striatal dopamine function in effort-related behavior,
mirroring findings from animal studies (Salamone et al., 2007;
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008) and psychopharmacological
findings in humans (Wardle et al., 2011).
Studies that have applied behavioral measures of “wanting” in
healthy controls also highlight the role of subcortical reward areas.
Using fMRI Aharon et al. revealed activity changes in parts of
the pleasure system, particularly the nucleus accumbens, during
passive viewing of beautiful female faces, while a more complex
set of subcortical and paralimbic reward regions followed aspects
of the key pressing procedure (Aharon et al., 2001). This is
in accordance with findings from animal studies consistently
showing that “wanting” mechanisms include larger networks in
the brain, compared to “liking” mechanisms, which are very
localized (Zhang et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2011; Peciña and
Berridge, 2013).
The study by Pessiglione et al. showed that even when
participants are unable to report how much money is at stake,
they still use more effort in terms of force for higher amounts
of money. Analysis of corresponding fMRI data revealed that the
reported unconscious motivational effect was underpinned by
bilateral engagement of the ventral pallidum (Pessiglione et al.,
2007). Their findings thus suggest that this region is a key node
in the brain circuitry that enables expected rewards to energize
behavior without the need of the participants’ awareness.
The reported role of the human ventral pallidum in incentive
motivation (“wanting”) accords well with findings from rodents,
which have consistently shown that the ventral pallidum is key
to goal-directed incentive salience processes (Smith and Berridge,
2005; Tindell et al., 2005; Aldridge and Berridge, 2010). Elevation
of dopamine in ventral pallidum appears to specifically enhance
neural firing to signals that encode maximal incentive salience in
rodents (Tindell et al., 2005). Similar to the nucleus accumbens
shell, hedonic “liking” and “wanting” are systematically mapped
in a neuroanatomically and neurochemically interactive manner
in the ventral pallidum (Smith and Berridge, 2005).
Summary
Following the literature in other animals, the wanting or the
motivational salience of rewards can now be investigated using
behavioral tasks in humans, measuring the amount of work that
participants are willing to expend for rewards.
Overall, the available data suggests that deficits in motivational
aspects of pleasure play an important role in anhedonia, as
evidenced by findings that patients suffering from depression
and schizophrenia are less willing to work for a reward,
compared to controls. The idea that motivational processes are
as important in anhedonia as hedonic impact was proposed
already in the 1990s (Willner et al., 1998; Kring, 1999;
Germans and Kring, 2000), and following recent successful
developments of behavioral tasks that measure motivational
aspects of pleasure processing in humans, the idea has gained
renewed interest (Treadway and Zald, 2011, 2013; Strauss and
Gold, 2012).
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Furthermore, there is direct evidence of the role of dopamine
and opioids in the regulation of “wanting” processes, and
imaging studies of healthy participants mirror findings from
animal studies by stressing the role of subcortical reward areas,
such as ventral pallidum and nucleus accumbens. However,
patient populations have yet to be extensively tested using effort-
based measures in combination with neuroimaging, which leaves
much scope for a better characterization of the underlying
networks involved in the reduced ability to pursue pleasure. The
development of effort-based measures of behavior is promising
and holds great promise in terms of investigating “wanting”
processes that are outside our conscious awareness and control
(see Figure 3).
IMPAIRMENTS IN REWARD LEARNING
A large number of animal studies have looked at the ability
to optimize behavior based on past experiences with rewards
and punishers using e.g., decision-making tasks. This literature
has elucidated some of the fundamental principles of learning
involved in reward processing and there is evidence that patients
suffering from anhedonia show impaired reward learning.
Behavioral measures of reward learning
A number of studies have looked at anhedonia using probabilistic
reward tasks that tap into the learning component of reward.
Pizzagalli et al. have used a probabilistic reward task which
measures the propensity to modulate behavior based on positive
reinforcement history. The task is based on signal-detection
theory and was originally developed by Tripp and Alsop (Tripp
and Alsop, 1999). In the task, an asymmetrical reinforcer ratio is
used (i.e., one stimuli is rewarded more frequently than another)
and one of the main outcome measures is the propensity to
develop a response bias toward the more rewarding stimulus. In
the first study, Pizzagalli et al. showed a different reward learning
pattern in participants with low vs. high levels of depressive
symptoms. While both groups developed a response bias toward
the more rewarding stimulus (i.e., indicative of a functioning
“learning” system), the response bias only increased over time
(from block 1 to block 3) in the group with low levels of
depressive symptoms (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Subsequent studies
of patients showed that clinically depressed patients had problems
integrating reinforcement history over time and failed to show
a response bias toward the more rewarding cue in the absence
of immediate reward. Further, this impairment correlated with
self-reported anhedonic symptoms (Pizzagalli et al., 2008). These
findings were recently replicated and extended by showing that
reward learning was reduced in depressed patients with high
levels of anhedonia symptoms, compared to patients with low
levels. Furthermore, reduced reward learning at entry increased
the odds for the depression diagnosis to persist after 8 weeks
of treatment (Vrieze et al., 2013). Recently, impaired reward
learning was even reported in patients with remitted depression
(Pechtel et al., 2013). In line with these findings, a recent study
using the EEfRT task reported that depressed patients were
less able to effectively use information about magnitude and
probability of reward to guide their choice behavior (Treadway
et al., 2012a).
Related to this, several studies have used probabilistic learning
tasks that differentiate between reward and punishment learning,
i.e., learning “by carrot or by stick”, and have shown impairments
in reinforcement learning in patients suffering from depression
and schizophrenia. Patients suffering from schizophrenia have
been consistently found to exhibit deficits in reward-driven
learning (Waltz et al., 2007, 2011; Strauss et al., 2011; Gold et al.,
2012; Yilmaz et al., 2012; Fervaha et al., 2013a), while findings
regarding punishment-driven learning are more conflicting. In
most studies punishment-driven learning is seemingly intact, but
a few recent studies also report impairments in punishment-
driven learning (Fervaha et al., 2013a; Reinen et al., 2014).
Less data is available on depressed patients, but Chase et al.
reported evidence of blunting in terms of smaller learning rates
in both positive and negative learning in a group of depressed
patients (Chase et al., 2010). Notably, the diagnosis group
accounted for considerably less of the variance in blunting than
individual differences in anhedonia, and the effect of depression
on blunting was very small if anhedonia was factored out.
Interestingly, human studies have shown that even without
conscious processing of contextual cues, the brain can learn
their reward value and use them to provide a bias on decision
making. In a subliminal instrumental conditioning task, where
the cues predicting monetary reward or punishment were
subliminal, participants still developed a propensity to choose
cues associated with monetary rewards relative to punishments
(Pessiglione et al., 2008). These findings support the notion
that reward and punishment also affect our behavior outside of
our awareness, thereby underscoring the problems inherent in
relying (only) on self-report measures. This type of paradigm
has not been applied to patient groups yet, but represents a
promising way to investigate possible impairments in implicit
learning.
In general, isolating reward learning from motivational
processes and hedonic impact is challenging. Although the
presented tasks focus on reward learning, aspects of wanting
and liking may interact and affect findings. For example, in the
probabilistic reward task adopted by Pizzagalli et al. one of the
main outcomes is the development of a bias toward the most
frequently rewarding stimulus. Although development of this bias
represents an ability to optimize behavior based on reinforcement
history, the task does not allow a complete disentanglement of
wanting, liking and learning. Development of this bias is likely
to be influenced by reward wanting, and since development of a
positive response bias also reflects an ability to value high reward
more than low reward, reward liking may interact.
Neuroimaging measures of reward learning
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying
impairments in reinforcement learning and corresponding brain
activity in patients suffering from depression and schizophrenia.
Some of these studies have investigated brain responses to
expectation and receipt of reward and punishment using
Pavlovian (i.e., passive) and instrumental (i.e., active) learning
paradigms. Related to this are also findings from the mentioned
MID task (Knutson et al., 2000), which can be used to examine
responses to reward receipt (i.e., liking), but may also inform
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us on associative learning by looking at neural responses during
reward expectation and reward receipt.
Several studies have applied these paradigms to patients
suffering from schizophrenia to examine whether abnormalities
in reward expectation and prediction error signals (i.e.,
differences between expected and actual outcome) could
underlie negative symptoms by disrupting learning and blunting
the salience of rewarding events. Overall, studies have revealed
blunted ventral striatal responses to cues predicting reward, which
has been associated with severity of negative symptoms in some
studies (Juckel et al., 2006a,b; Simon et al., 2010; Dowd and Barch,
2012). Similarly, there is evidence of blunted striatal activity in
response to prediction errors (i.e., responses that do not match
expectations) or reward receipt (Schlagenhauf et al., 2009; Waltz
et al., 2009; Koch et al., 2010; Gradin et al., 2011), although some
studies have reported almost intact neural responses (Simon
et al., 2010; Waltz et al., 2010; Dowd and Barch, 2012). This
inconsistency of findings may be partly explained by the fact that
schizophrenia patients are a heterogeneous group. Importantly,
several of these studies found an association between reduced
striatal responses to reward receipt and increased negative or
depressive symptoms (Waltz et al., 2009, 2010; Simon et al., 2010).
Findings from studies of depressed patients also report blunted
striatal responses to reward learning, although less data is
available. Using a Pavlovian learning task during fMRI, Kumar
et al., reported blunted responses to reward learning signals
in depressed patients in regions including ventral striatum and
midbrain (Kumar et al., 2008). Similar findings were reported
using an instrumental learning task. Compared to controls,
depressed patients had reduced activity associated with prediction
errors in the striatum and midbrain, and the extent of signal
reduction correlated with increased (self-reported) anhedonia
severity (Gradin et al., 2011). None of these studies reported
behavioral differences between depressed patients and controls
(i.e., self-reported pleasure from the reward, accuracy).
In contrast to this, Steele et al. reported a blunted response
in depressed patients in both behavioral and neural responses
(measured with fMRI) to feedback information during a
gambling task (Steele et al., 2007). Control participants responded
to losses by an increase in reaction time and activity of the anterior
cingulate cortex, while patients did not increase their reaction
times or activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. Similarly,
controls responded to wins by a reduction in reaction times and
activity in the ventral striatum, while patients showed none of
these effects. Further, self-reported anhedonia correlated with
reaction time adjustment, with increases in anhedonia being
associated with smaller reaction time effects.
These findings are in line with findings from e.g., Chase et al.
who also found support for blunting both in terms of positive
and negative feedback (Chase et al., 2010). Further, measures of
self-reported anhedonia seem to be modulating the magnitude of
these parameters with increasing anhedonia being associated with
reduced effects.
The study of subliminal instrumental conditioning by
Pessiglione et al. also allowed for analysis of corresponding
patterns of brain activity using fMRI data (Pessiglione et al.,
2008). During conditioning, both cue values and prediction errors
correlated with activity in the ventral striatum. Hence, activity
patterns were similar to those found in studies using paradigms
where contextual cues are consciously perceived (Pagnoni et al.,
2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006).
Summary
Taken together, the bulk of the evidence suggests that anhedonia
is associated with a blunted or attenuated ability to learn to
respond to feedback information, i.e., problems with learning
reinforcement to alter behavior in patients suffering from
depression and schizophrenia. This is particularly evident
in terms of reward-driven learning, while findings regarding
punishment-driven learning are mixed in patients suffering from
schizophrenia. The attenuated ability to learn from feedback
information is supported in neuroimaging studies by revealing
blunted ventral striatal responses during learning in patients
suffering from schizophrenia and depression, which in some
cases was associated with severity of self-reported anhedonia
symptoms. It is also notable that instrumental learning outside
conscious awareness produces similar activity in brain reward
networks to what has been reported in conscious instrumental
conditioning studies.
RECONCEPTUALIZING ANHEDONIA IN PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
Based on the presented evidence, it is difficult to maintain a
view of anhedonia as a unitary process, which only manifests
itself in the reduced ability to experience subjective pleasure.
Instead, the available data strongly suggests that anhedonia should
be redefined to reflect the heterogeneous nature of hedonic
processing across disorders and individuals. We therefore propose
to reconceptualize anhedonia as the breakdown or unbalancing
of any or all of the complex psychological processes involved
in reward processing as it unfolds over time in the pleasure
cycle (Figure 1). In the normal brain, wanting, liking and
learning processes are balanced over time (Figure 2). However,
impairments in each of the subcomponents of reward can
lead to specific symptoms (or subtypes) of anhedonia that are
associated with specific imbalances between wanting, liking and
learning processes in the brain. In order to disentangle the
engagement of the various reward components, behavioral or
physiological measures are needed to complement self-report
measures, which will help in terms of quantifying core “liking”,
“wanting” and “learning” components, as well as their explicit
counterparts.
The currently available data does not support the notion
that all components of hedonic processing are compromised at
the same time in various psychiatric disorders. Instead, perhaps
surprisingly, some aspects of conscious liking—which is what
most people intuitively associate with pleasure—can be seemingly
intact in the psychiatric disorders traditionally associated with
anhedonia, including depression and schizophrenia. In contrast,
wanting and learning components are more easily compromised
(see Figure 2). Many studies of patients suffering from depression
and schizophrenia show deficits in these domains, for example
in terms of reduced willingness to work for a reward, and
reduced ability to learn from reward and punishment, while some
aspects of liking can be seemingly intact (as reviewed in sections
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Impairments in liking, Impairments in wanting and Impairments
in reward learning).
This raises the interesting question that if liking is in fact
intact (as shown in experimental taste-reactivity investigations),
why do patients suffering from depression and schizophrenia
subjectively report this symptom in clinical inventories and
interviews? One possibility is that core “liking” reactions remain
intact, yet patients no longer cognitively value them as they did
before (Dichter et al., 2010; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011). This
interpretation is supported by data showing that while online
measures of hedonic impact are intact, patients suffering from
depression and schizophrenia report reduced enjoyment when
asked to rate future, past or hypothetical experience (McFarland
and Klein, 2009; Watson and Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Strauss
and Gold, 2012), which is standard in most clinical interviews
assessing anhedonia.
At the same time, this interpretation has to be seen in
the light of standard clinical examinations of patients, where
depression with anhedonia is associated with direct behavioral
characteristics implying a problem that is not only related to
cognitive evaluations of past and future. For example, clinicians
often report fewer facial expressions, less smiling, less reactivity to
stimuli and other types of symptoms that could reflect diminished
“liking”. This disagreement between clinical observations and
findings from studies applying taste-reactivity paradigms in
humans stresses the need to consider methodological aspects. The
seemingly intact “liking” reactions to pleasurable solutions and
odors are based on self-report measures, and it is possible that
behavioral or physiological measures will inform us differently.
Another possibility is that core “liking” reactions are intact
in some subtypes of anhedonia, but suppressed in other types,
and correspondingly with the cognitive evaluations. One of the
main reasons for our reconceptualization is to stress the notion
that anhedonia is not a unitary process, but is instead a complex
psychological process which consists of several subcomponents
that can occur on different levels of conscious awareness and
control (similar to reward). As reviewed here, deficits in each of
the reward components, and corresponding imbalance between
components, can lead to different expressions, or subtypes of
anhedonia.
In future, it may be more useful to define separate subtypes
of anhedonia, reflecting impairments in the specific reward
components. In line with this reasoning, Treadway and Zald have
suggested to differentiate between motivational, consummatory
and decisional anhedonia (Treadway and Zald, 2011). It may
even be more useful to replace the term anhedonia with
more functional terms such as diminished (or elevated) reward
wanting, and diminished (or elevated) reward liking. Although
anhedonia has traditionally been associated with diminished
responses, our proposed framework acknowledges that both too
much and too little activity in specific parts of the pleasure system
can lead to pathological changes. This is for example illustrated in
the excessive wanting for drugs in drug addiction or in disorders
with hypersexuality.
Related to this is also the well-documented negative response
bias in (at least) depressed patients (Leppanen, 2006), which
may account for some of the discrepancy between what patients
report in here-and-now situations, and how they cognitively value
past and future events. The lateral habenula is known to be a
key structure in mediating the response to emotionally negative
states (Hikosaka et al., 2008; Hikosaka, 2010), as well as the
balance of activity between the amygdala and nucleus accumbens
(Willner et al., 2013). Increased activity in the lateral habenula
(induced e.g., by stress) can lead to an increase in the salience of
aversive stimuli and a decrease in the saliency of appetitive stimuli,
and as such offers a plausible neurobiological substrate for
the negative information-processing bias seen in e.g., depressed
patients (Disner et al., 2011; Willner et al., 2013). Dysfunctions
of this limbic-striatal relay nucleus have been implicated in
depression and schizophrenia (Hikosaka et al., 2008), and recently
beneficial effects were reported in a treatment-resistant depressed
patient receiving deep brain stimulation in this target (Sartorius
et al., 2010).
Overall, more studies are needed before we can make
conclusive statements regarding the role of wanting, liking,
and learning processes in anhedonia in psychiatric disorders.
In particular, development of valid behavioral or physiological
measures of hedonic impact is needed before we can make any
conclusive statements regarding the role and nature of liking
processes in anhedonia. As already stressed, the current finding
that here-and-now measures of hedonic reactivity can be intact
(in depressed and schizophrenic patients) is based on self-
report alone. Future studies applying behavioral or physiological
measures of “liking” in studies of anhedonia might inform us
differently.
In addition to depression and schizophrenia, which have
traditionally been associated with anhedonia, there has been
a growing interest in the role of anhedonia across disorders,
in particular addictive disorders, including gambling disorder
(Ahmed and Koob, 1998; Markou et al., 1998; Koob and
Le Moal, 2001; Volkow et al., 2002; Rømer Thomsen et al.,
2009; Hatzigiakoumis et al., 2011), eating disorders (Davis
and Woodside, 2002; Jiang et al., 2010; Keranen et al., 2010;
Tchanturia et al., 2012), and Parkinson’s disease (Isella et al., 2003;
Loas and Krystkowiak, 2010; Santiago et al., 2010; Loas et al.,
2012).
In addictive disorders, motivational processes are more
pertinent than liking per se, and overall addictions represent a
clear example of how wanting can be dissociated from liking.
In contrast to depression, drug addiction is characterized by
an excess of drug wanting, which is rarely accompanied by the
expected feeling of pleasure in pathological cases (Figure 2).
Further, the excessive and never-ending chase of the reward of
choice leaves little room for the pursuit of other pleasures. In
other words, drug craving is expressive of an unhealthy form of
wanting that pushes aside goal-directed behavior toward other
pleasurable activities, as described in the influential incentive-
sensitization theory of drug addiction (Robinson and Berridge,
1993; Robinson et al., 2013). Similar mechanisms are likely to
be at play in behavioral addiction, such as gambling disorder,
which is also characterized by an excess of wanting, that is
rarely matched by the expected feeling of liking (Rømer Thomsen
et al., 2014). Until recently, gambling disorder was classified as
an impulse control disorder (American Psychiatric Association,
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1994). However, due to a large overlap with drug addiction in
terms of clinical symptoms and underlying neurobiology, there
has been a growing agreement to view gambling disorder as a
behavioral addiction (Russell, 1996; Gold et al., 2008; Potenza,
2008; McCabe et al., 2009; Smoski et al., 2009; Frascella et al.,
2010), which has been acknowledged in the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Another class of psychiatric disorders, eating disorders, could
benefit from a reconceptualization of anhedonia. Berridge et al.
suggested that patients suffering from some forms of eating
disorders can be characterized as having normal levels of
wanting, but low levels of liking of food (Berridge et al., 2010).
In other types of eating disorders this pattern is reversed.
Binge eating, for example, may be characterized by an excess
of wanting, which is rarely followed by the expected feeling
of pleasure, similar to drug and behavioral addiction. For
some patients (at the severe end of the continuum) their
eating disorder may in fact resemble addiction, and should
perhaps be termed food addiction. However, this group of
patients would appear to be relatively small (Berridge et al.,
2010).
Additional support for the important role of motivational
processes and underlying mesolimbic dopamine systems comes
from the study of Parkinson’s Disease. While brief administration
of dopamine agonists showed improved willingness to work for
a reward in healthy controls (Wardle et al., 2011), long-term
treatment with dopamine agonists in Parkinson’s patients can
cause compulsive behavior, such as pathological gambling activity
or hyper-sexuality in some patients (Weintraub et al., 2006; Voon
et al., 2009, 2011). As suggested by our reconceptualization of
anhedonia, it would appear that both too much and too little
activity in specific components can lead to pathological changes
(Kringelbach et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2013). It would be of
considerable interest to carry out studies of anhedonia in this
patient group. Interestingly, it was recently shown that apathy
in some Parkinson’s patients is related to goal-directed behavior
and anticipatory, but not consummatory, anhedonia (Jordan
et al., 2013), supporting our proposed reconceptualization of
anhedonia.
Taken together, the available data suggests that anhedonia
is heterogeneous across disorders. Considerable progress can
be expected when a deeper understanding of the interplay and
balance between each of the underlying reward components
in disorders is gained. Improving our understanding of
the neurobiological underpinnings of specific behavioral
disruptions such as anhedonia is crucial because it will
facilitate treatment of disorders that include such symptoms
(Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012). The development of
objective behavioral measures of e.g., “wanting” processes
can facilitate this process and help elucidate the neurobiology
of impairments in the ability to seek pleasure. This work has
already begun, for example with the EEfRT. However, patient
groups have yet to be extensively tested using behavioral
measures of wanting, liking, and learning in combination
with neuroimaging, which leaves much scope for better
characterization of the various imbalances in the human
pleasure networks.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF
ANHEDONIA
Our proposal of anhedonia as impairments in specific reward
components and corresponding unbalancing of pleasure
networks both broadens and strengthens the use of anhedonia in
providing useful diagnostic markers for mental illness. As such it
offers a number of potential test instruments that could be more
reliable and specific than the existing self-report questionnaires
for anhedonia. These tests may offer greater specificity in
diagnosing anhedonia in many heterogeneous psychological
disorders, where symptoms may be expressed differently across
people, or even differently across time within the same individual
(Nelson et al., 2009).
Take depression as an example. In the DSM-5, anhedonia is
described as “decreased interest and pleasure in most activities
most of the day” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013),
thereby collapsing wanting and liking. This is in contrast to
the large literature suggesting that these processes are in fact
dissociable. Although patients suffering from depression often
report reduced enjoyment on a cognitive level (measured in
clinical interviews and self-report inventories), there is evidence
that not all patients have similar impairments in core “liking”
reactions. At the same time there is increasing evidence of
impairments in reward motivation and reward learning in
depressed patients. Considering that there is compelling evidence
that wanting, liking and learning processes are not subserved by
the exact same networks in the brain (e.g., mesolimbic dopamine
is more involved in wanting than liking), potential future medical
(and psychological) treatment could be informed and improved
by a better characterization of the specific reward-related
deficits in individual patients. As a start, self-report measures
of enjoyment could usefully be complemented with behavioral
measures of motivation and learning.
Animal behavioral paradigms have been developed that
measure specific components of reward processing, and there
has been recent progress in developing translational tools for
use in humans. Hopefully these measures will continue to be
developed and applied to relevant patient groups, and in time
help us obtain a fuller picture of anhedonia, and consequently
help improve treatment options. In particular, tests that tap
into the unconscious components of this processing can be
very useful. For example, wanting processes that occur outside
of awareness are important for addiction, as outlined by the
incentive-sensitization theory (Robinson et al., 2013). This
acknowledgment of unconscious mechanisms has implications
for treatment. e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy is important in
terms of targeting conscious craving mechanisms in addiction
(Potenza et al., 2011), but although it reduces some layers of
responsiveness to drug-cues, unconscious layers are likely to
persist (Robinson et al., 2013). In contrast, mindfulness-based
interventions can potentially target unconscious “wanting”
mechanisms by increasing awareness of bodily and emotional
signals (Garland et al., 2014). Preliminary findings show that
these treatments reduce consumption of several substances and is
associated with a reduction in craving in substance users although
more randomized controlled trials are warranted (Chiesa and
Serretti, 2014).
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Given the identification of the importance of the motivational
component of anhedonia, and given the well-documented role
of dopamine in incentive salience processing, it is important to
acknowledge the role of dopamine in the study of anhedonia
(and disorders characterized by anhedonic symptoms such as
depression). Improving current treatments for e.g., depression
may well be aided by a conceptual shift towards focusing on
anhedonia and the role of dopamine in the interaction with
serotonin. Evidence for such a shift comes from a number
of sources including convergent findings from neuroimaging,
post-mortem, behavioral and pharmacological studies pointing
to a reduced dopamine function in depression (Kumar et al.,
2008). This should also be seen in the context of the
emerging evidence that treatments solely targeting serotonergic
noradrenergic systems have limited efficacy, e.g., as shown in
meta-analyzes of antidepressant efficacy compared to placebo
(Kirsch et al., 2008). The findings reviewed here point to
an important role of mesolimbic dopamine and opioids in
anhedonia symptoms, and are in line with recent proposals to
target these neurotransmitters more directly in depressed, or
anhedonic, patients (Kumar et al., 2008; Treadway and Zald, 2011;
Soskin et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
This review has discussed the emerging evidence for the
functional neuroanatomy of pleasure and shown how the specific
breakdown of any or all of the underlying components of wanting,
liking, and learning can lead to a malfunctioning pleasure system.
This in turn can be conceptualized as anhedonia, the lack of ability
to experience, pursue, and/or learn about pleasure. We discussed
the heterogeneity of anhedonia across psychiatric disorders
and specifically pointed out the dissociation between wanting,
liking, and learning components. We reviewed the behavioral
and neuroimaging studies of anhedonia as the reduced ability
to experience, pursue, and learn from pleasure, and stressed
the importance of including their nonconscious counterparts.
This pointed to a pertinent role of both wanting, liking, and
learning components, which is in contrast to the traditional
view of anhedonia as (only) reduced subjective liking. In fact,
the evidence suggested that here-and-now measures of pleasure
liking are seemingly intact in patients suffering from depression
and schizophrenia (although this may be due to methodological
challenges). In contrast, wanting and learning components are
more easily compromised in these patients, for example in terms
of reduced willingness to work for a reward, and reduced ability
to learn from reward and punishment. Related to this, evidence
from animal studies supports the notion that the capacity for
“liking” reactions is rather robust in the brain, by showing that
only one of the hedonic hotspots in the posterior ventral pallidum
is necessary for “liking” (Cromwell and Berridge, 1993; Smith
et al., 2010).
The findings reviewed here should, however, be seen in
the context of a number of limitations or caveats. First of
all, the reported findings of normal levels of pleasure liking
in here-and-now measurements in depressed and schizophrenic
patients are based on self-report. Development of valid behavioral
measures of “liking” reactions that can be applied in human
studies are needed before we can make conclusive claims.
In contrast, behavioral measures of “wanting” and “learning”
mechanisms have been succesfully translated from animal to
human studies. Some of these measures have started to be
applied in relevant patient groups and offer intriuging new
insights on the reduced ability to seek and learn about pleasure.
However, patient groups have yet to be extensively tested
using behavioral measures of wanting, liking, and learning in
combination with neuroimaging, which leaves much scope
for a better characterization of the underlying neurobiology.
New imaging techniques, in particular magnetoencephalography
(MEG), which offers a unique combination of high temporal and
spatial resolution, represent promising new tools to capture and
tease apart the rapid emotional processes likely to occur outside
of our awareness.
Another important caveat is that so far the majority of human
studies of the brain regions involved in anhedonia have been
correlative in nature, thereby limiting our knowledge of the
underlying brain circuitries. We need a better understanding of
which brain regions are sufficient and necessary for rebalancing
pleasure networks in neuropsychiatric disorders. Such knowledge
is difficult to obtain from human studies, although new
information is trickling in from studies using causal methods
such as psychopharmacological methods with e.g., conditioned
place preferences (Mayo et al., 2013; Mayo and De Wit, 2015)
as well as more direct brain manipulations such as transcranial
magnetic stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation and
deep brain stimulation (Kringelbach et al., 2007, 2011; Lozano
and Lipsman, 2013).
In addition, computational neuroscience may help generate
new information. The progress in using diffusion tensor
imaging methods to track changes in brain connectivity in
neuropsychiatric disorders together with the high temporal and
spatial resolution of MEG will allow us to make computational
models that can accurately predict the functional consequences
of structural abnormalities. In time, this new understanding may
lead to more precise diagnoses and treatments of anhedonia
(Deco and Kringelbach, 2014).
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